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Ambivalence in Equivalents: Problems and Solutions
for Patent Law's Doctrine of Equivalents

INTRODUCTION

In 1988, Horst Saalbach began a lawsuit involving the infringement
of two patents owned by his Long Island robotics company, Festo
Corporation. Today, after 15 years ofcontinual litigation, including two
trips to the United States Supreme Court, his case is still not resolved.
In May of 2002, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Festo
Corporationv. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo KabushikiCompany,Limited'
(known as SMC2), vacating a controversial Court of Appeals decision
and remanding the case once again for further proceedings. Saalbach, a
naturalized U.S. citizen who escaped communist East Germany when he
was seventeen, continues this fight because ofhis belief in the principles
of the Constitution.' He has the resources to persist because Festo
Corporation is a $1.5 billion company with 10,000 employees
worldwide.4
However, Festo represents perfectly a serious flaw in the patent
system today. The policy of patent law involved, the Doctrine of
Equivalents, has caused at least as many problems in the last twenty
years as it has solved. Applying the doctrine is problematical for courts
because, as Festo itself demonstrates, it does not allow for precise
boundaries. The Supreme Court has described problems with the
doctrine,5 and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has gone so
far as to call application of the doctrine "unworkable." 6 This policv is
also costly for litigants as the cases involved tend to be closely contested
and, like Festo,are sometimes appealed for years.7 Since relatively few
Copyright 2004, by LOUIsIANA LAW REVIEW
1. 535 U.S. 722, 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002).
2. The respondent company's name is Japanese and translates to "Sintered
Metal Company," hence the abbreviation SMC. See http://www.smcworld.com
(last visited Jan. 30, 2004).
3. Saalbach stepped down as president and CEO ofFesto Corporation in early

2002 after quadruple bypass surgery and now serves as board vice chairman. Mark
Harrington, Fighting for His Rights, Newsday.com, January 1, 2002, at
http://www.newsday.com/technology/reviews/ny-biz-festo0 102,0,7225251 .story
(last visited Jan. 30, 2004).
4. Id.
5. Festo, 122 S.Ct. at 1837. For a discussion of these problems, see text
accompanying notes 129-134.
6. Festo, 234 F.3d. 558, 575 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Specifically, the Court of
Appeals explained, "[i]n patent law, we think that rules qualify as 'workable' when
they can be relied upon to produce consistent results and give rise to a body of law
that provides guidance to the marketplace on how to conduct its affairs."
7. See generallyKimberly A. Moore, Judges,Juries,andPatentCases-An
EmpiricalPeek Inside the Black Box, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 365, 396-401 (2001).
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patent holders can afford the one million dollar average cost of patent
litigation,8 the rights ofmany patent holders are effectively diminished.
This note argues that a solution to this problem is for Congress to
eliminate the Doctrine ofEquivalents. Such legislation may seem at first
to be controversial, and it may not have been an optimal solution twenty
years ago, but it is feasible today. The doctrine was considered an
important equitable solution when first introduced by the Supreme Court
some 150 years ago,9 but it has since become outdated and unnecessary.
The sheer volume ofpatent applications makes reform ofthe system
especially desirable. In late 1999, the six-millionth patent was granted
in the United States. At the present rate of filing this number will double
in only sixteen years.10 Eliminating the doctrine of equivalents is
therefore needed to increase judicial efficiency by clarifying claim
interpretation, thus bringing certainty and predictability to the patent
process. Since a patent is a contract, the doctrine can be replaced with
traditional common law rules of contract interpretation. This proposed
legislation would not be applied retroactively, so it would not impact the
present owners ofunexpired patents.
Part I of this note provides a background of patent principles,
including the doctrine of equivalents and its counterpart, prosecution
history estoppel. Part II introduces the procedural history of Festo,
leading up to the highly anticipated Supreme Court decision issued in
2002, analyzes the Court's holding and reasoning, and summarizes
recent developments in the case. Part III shows that the Court's decision
in Festo opened the door for congressional action to eliminate the
doctrine of equivalents and discusses the rationale and benefits of such
legislation.
I. PATENT LAW-AN OVERVIEW

A. The PatentProcess
A patent is a contract between an inventor and the government."
An inventor applies for his patent by making claims to the United
8. See American Intellectual Property Law Association, Report of Economic
Survey, 1999, at 69.
9. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853), discussed in text
accompanying notes 44-48.
10. The first U.S. patent was awarded in 1790, so this comprises a period of
209 years. Craig Hovey, The Patent Process: A Guide to Intellectual Property for
the Information Age, 1-2 (2002).
11. The Supreme Court has described this quidproquo as "a carefully crafted
bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure ofnew, useful and nonobvious
advances in technology and design in return for the exclusive right to practice the
invention for a period of years." Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
489 U.S. 141, 150, 109 S. Ct. 971, 977 (1989).
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States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). 2 These claims form the
basis of the inventor's legal protection. They are his property and can
be quite valuable.' 3 The patentee is given what can become a
monopoly over his invention for "limited times,"' 4 as granted by the
Constitution. 5 He has the exclusive right to manufacture, use, and
sell the patented device, or simply to prevent others from doing so. 6
The process of interaction between the PTO examiner and the
inventor is called the prosecution history.'7 During this process, the
patent examiner either allows or rejects the inventor's claims.
Rejected claims may then be amended by the inventor, and the patent
examiner will then either allow or reject the amended claims." These
negotiations last on average about eighteen months 9 and can include
an interview with the examiner.2 0 Receiving a patent is not a simple
task, and patent attorneys must have scientific and/or technical
backgrounds and special certification to write patent applications.2
In exchange for receiving a patent, an inventor must disclose his
invention to the public. This is the public notice requirement, and
' by allowing others to see
it promotes the "progress of science"23
exactly what has been patented and to improve upon it.24 Patent laws
protect both pioneering inventions and technological improvements
2
Each type ofinvention
made by others on existing patented devicesY.
is vital to the advancement of technology. A pioneering invention is
one that performs a function never before achieved, such as the
phonograph or the laser.26 More than 90% ofall patented inventions,
however, are simply advances over existing technology2 7 as is the
12. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2003).
13. David A. Burge, Patent and Trademark Tactics and Practice 32 (1999); Joy
L. Bryant, Protecting Your Ideas, The Inventor's Guide to Patents 25 (1999).
14. Currently, 20 years from filing date. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2003).
15. U.S. Const. art I, § 8, ci. 8.
16. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2003).
17. Irah H. Donner, Patent Prosecution: Practice & Procedure Before the U.S.
Patent Office 6 (1999).
18. 35 U.S.C. § 132 (2003).
19. Kimberly Pace Moore, Paul R. Michel & Michael V. Lupo, Patent
Litigation and Strategy 4 (1999).
20. Interviews can be either in person or over the phone. Donner, supranote
17, at 67-71.
21. 37 C.F.R. § 10.7 (2003).
22. Donner, supranote 17, at 3.
23. U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
24. Donner, supranote 17, at 3.
25. This has been the case since the first U.S. patent laws were enacted by
Congress. The Patent Act of 1790, Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109.
26. Travis Brown, Historical First Patents, The First United States Patent for
Many Everyday Things 119, 140 (1994).
27. Hovey, supranote 10, at 25.

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 64

robotics device which is the subject of the Festo controversy.28
Such "design-arounds" are essential to progress because when a
device is made better or cheaper without infringing existing patents,
the public benefits. This benefit is made possible by the public
notice requirement.
The essence of patent law, therefore, is a balancing of two
competing interests-the inventor's right to control his work versus
society's right to use it. If the patent holder is given too much
protection, a fear of infringing by competitors discourages
innovation, so the public suffers. With too little protection,
copycats flourish. In either case, with less incentive to innovate, the
effect is exactly the same.29 Courts are largely responsible for
balancing these interests, and the patent community has watched
them struggle to strike the right balance between these competing
issues for many years.30
B. PatentRights as PropertyRights
A patent creates a property right in an invention which is
analogous to a real property right.3 ' Like real property, patents can
be sold, or "rented" through licensing, and the fees generated are
royalties. 32 The patent owner can also prevent "trespassers" from
using his property with the threat or the act of a lawsuit. What a
patent owner actually owns are his claims-the verbal descriptions
of his invention.33 These legally define the invention in the same
way that a metes and bounds description in a property deed
describes the property conveyed by the deed.34 Claims become part
of the public domain and therefore must be clearly written so that
28. For a description of the device, see text accompanying notes 73-75.
29. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual
PropertyLaw, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 989, 990 (1997).
30. For an account of how the pendulum has swung back and forth between
judicial protection of patent-owners and their competitors, see Jay I. Alexander,
Cabiningthe Doctrine of Equivalents in Festo: A HistoricalPerspectiveon the
Relationship between the Doctrine of Equivalents and Prosecution History
Estoppel, 51 Am. U.L. Rev. 553 (2002).
31. Robert P. Merges & John F. Duffy, Patent Law and Policy: Cases and
Materials, 48 (2002).
32. Thomas T. Gordon & Arthur S. Cookfair, Patent Fundamentals for
Scientists and Engineers I1 (1995).
33. Robert L. Harmon, Patents and the Federal Circuit 3 (1991). Judge Giles
Rich ofthe CAFC has frequently been quoted as saying "to coin a phrase, the name
ofthe game is the claim." Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co. Inc.,
62 F.3d 1512, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1995), In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed.
Cir. 1998); Electronic Planroom, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d
805, 833 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
34. Herbert F. Schwartz, Patent Law and Practice 7-8 (1996).
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the patent holder knows what he owns and so that "the public
should know what he does not.""
When a patent application is filed with the PTO, an examiner will
search through the pertinent literature to determine if the invention is
really new, useful, and not obvious.36 The body of technical
information available to the public to determine these facts is known
in the trade as "prior art."' 3 ' A patent application is typically rejected
the first time it is examined because it usually does not fully conform
to the requirements ofthe Patent Act.38 Often, the PTO examiner will
require that at least one claim is changed, usually with the effect of
narrowing it. When a claim is narrowed, the inventor is said to have
"surrendered" some of the territory he originally requested (to
continue the real property analogy). But since the inventor may not
be able to get a3patent without making the requested changes, he
usually does so.
When a claim is amended, a question sometimes arises as to
whether the original claim should receive the same protection from
infringement as does the final one. For example, if an inventor states
in his original application that the process he wants to patent
functions in "a large pH range," the examiner may require him to
narrow that range to avoid a conflict with the prior art. 40 If the
inventor complies by amending the claim to state that the process
works in solutions with a pH of"approximately 6.0 to 9.0," does the
4
inventor then lose the right to a process that works at a pH of 5.0? 1
In other words, how broadly should claims be interpreted? On the
one hand, effective patent protection would require claims to be read
broadly enough to encompass the work envisioned by the inventor.
The notice function, on the other hand, requires a narrow reading so
35.

Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1837.

36. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 (2003).
37.

Merges, supranote 31, at 36.

38. Commonly, a claim is rejected because it conflicts with the prior art.
Richard Stim, Intellectual Property: Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights, 483

(2001).
39. A claim which receives a final rejection may be appealed to the Patent
Office Board ofPatent Appeals and Interferences (35 U.S.C. § 134). Additionally,
claims can be appealed to the Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit, and some
have even gone to the Supreme Court. Donner, supranote 17, at 59, 75, 81.
40. pH isthe measure ofacidity or basicity of asolution and specifically refers
to the hydrogen ion concentration. pH values below 7are acidic, those above 7 are
basic, and a pH of 7 is neutral. The New Encyclopedia Britannica 350 (15th ed.
1989).
41. This requires one to argue that 5.0 is equivalent to approximately 6.0.
Though this may seem like an easy question, it is a difficult one under the doctrine
of equivalents, and it is the situation which occurred in the case of WarnerJenkinson (discussed at length in text accompanying notes 56-64), a case which
was litigated for several years but was never actually resolved by the courts.
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that the words retain their meaning and the public can clearly
ascertain what is protected. Two doctrines were created by the courts
to attempt to deal with these divergent ends-the Doctrine of
Equivalents and Prosecution History Estoppel.
C. The Doctrineof Equivalents
An inventor is protected not only against literal infringement of
his patent, but also against "knock-offs," instances where a copyist
attempts to avoid liability by making minor, insignificant changes to
the invention. This protection is achieved in two ways-by meansplus-function claim writing and by the doctrine of equivalents.
The federal statute that provides specifications for claim-writing
was amended in 1952 to make the task easier for patent agents and
more advantageous for inventors. This so-called "means plus
fimction" method allows for claims to describe the functions ofparts
rather than particular
materials themselves, thus giving more property
42,,,
to patentees. For example, one may use the word "fastener" rather
than "screw" in a claim to prevent a competitor from building a
device using a nail or staple simply to avoid literal infringement. The
patent agent writes the claim as broadly as possible to encompass all
the territory the PTO will allow him to claim (in this case, nails,
screws, adhesives, staples, rivets, etc.) so that ideally there is little
question as to what property the patent-holder owns.
The other device designed to protect inventors from infringement
is the doctrine of equivalents, wherein patent owners are given a
protected zone around the literal scope oftheir claims. In 1856, the
Supreme Court created this doctrine in Winans v. Denmead.44 The
plaintiff in this case had invented railroad cars for carrying coal which
were "cylindrical and conical" in shape and were a considerable
improvement over traditionally shaped cars. 45 The defendants
manufactured a similar car, though it did not literally infringe the
patent. 46 In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that since the defendants'
product substantially embodied the invention, it was equivalent and
hence the doctrine of equivalents was created.4 ' Notice that meansplus-function claim writing did not exist at this time, but even so, the
dissenters strongly felt the patentee should be held only to the claims
he owned. The dissenters noted that the language of the patent was
42.
43.
(2003).
44.
45.
46.
47.

35 U.S.C. § 112 6(2003).
Edward F. O'Connor, Intellectual Property Law and Litigation 63-65
56 U.S. 330, 14 L. Ed. 717 (1853).
Id. at 332.
The defendants' cars were octagonal and pyramidal. Id.
Id. at 344.
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"full, clear, and exact," and since the defendants had designed a
different shape, there was no infringement.48
This doctrine of equivalents was problematical from the start
because the Court offered no test to determine equivalence. The
Court directly addressed the issue again a century later in Graver
Tank & ManufacturingCompany v. LindeAir ProductsCompany,49
where it laid out the modem contours of the doctrine. The test for
equivalence would be to ask if the infringing device "performs
substantially the same function in substantially the same way to
obtain the same result." 50 If the answer to this "function/way/result"
test was yes, the two products would be deemed the same and
infringement would have occurred. 5 This test has increasingly been
criticized by courts because it often does not work in a modem
technological society.5 2 Federal Appeals Court Judge Alan D. Lourie
gave an example of this problem in 1997, noting that, for example,
aspirin and ibuprofen perform the same function in the same way to
obtain the same result, but they are not equivalent. They have
different chemical structures, and no one would consider one to
infringe the other.53 Additionally, the function/way/result test is
difficult for juries to apply because patent cases can be notoriously
technical and complicated.54 The test gives confused juries the
opportunity to essentially rewrite claims, which is not allowed in
patent interpretation. 55
Another fifty years passed before the Supreme Court again
addressed the doctrine of equivalents in Warner-JenkinsonCompany
v. Hilton Davis Chemical Company.56 It involved the pH example
used throughout this note. The plaintiffs patented a process for
removing impurities from dyes by filtering them through a
membrane.57 The amended claim in the patent called for this to be
accomplished in solution "at a pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0.' ' "8
The upper limit of 9.0 was added to the original claim because a
48. Id. at 347.
49. 339 U.S. 605, 70 S. Ct. 854 (1950).

50. Id. at 608, 70 S.Ct. 856.
51. Id.

52. Richard T. Holzmann, Infringement of the United States Patent Right, A
Guide for Executives and Attorneys 85 (1995). See also, O'Connor, supranote 43,
at 72; Donner, supranote 17, at 629.
53. HiltonDavis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 62 F.3d 1512, 1546
(Fed. Cir. 1997).

54. James M. Amend, Patent Law: APrimer for Federal District Court Judges,

3 (1998). See generallyMoore, supra note 7; Moore, infra note 72.
55. Harmon, supra note 33, at 179.
56. 520U.S. 17, 117S. Ct. 1040(1997).

57. Id. at 21, 117 S.Ct. at 1045.
58. Id. at 22, 117 S. Ct. at 1045.
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previous patent had already claimed pH values of 9.0 and above.59
The parties disagreed as to why the lower limit of6.0 was chosen.'
Because the reason was not known, the Court remanded the case to
determine the reason for the change. 6 '
In remanding, the Court instructed the Court of Appeals to use
the doctrine ofequivalents even though it also noted that "Congress
can legislate the doctrine of equivalents out of existence any time
it chooses." 62 The Court cautioned that the doctrine should not be
applied too broadly and further limited it by stating that it should
only be applied element-by-element. 63 The Court placed the burden
on the patentee to show that he did not amend his claim for reasons
of patentability. 64 If he could not meet this burden, then he would
be estopped from arguing equivalence. So in the case of WarnerJenkinson, if the patentee could not show that he added the lower
pH limit of "approximately 6.0" for a reason unrelated to
patentability, then he would not be allowed to argue that a pH of 5.0
was equivalent.
Though it has been weakened by the holding of WarnerJenkinson, the doctrine of equivalents was designed to give the
patentee a zone around the literal wording of a claim and therefore
more property. Referring back to the real property analogy, patent
claims mark the actual boundaries which the patent-holder owns.
But here is where intellectual property differs from real
property-what if a landowner decided to fence in the land he
owned, and the law allowed him to enclose an extra twenty or thirty
feet in every direction around the perimeter ofthe property actually
described in his deed? The extra acreage could add up to a
considerable amount of land that he would now have full use of, and
the law would then protect his interests in it. In close analogy, the
patent owner is given a penumbra around the literal wording of his
claim to protect him against equivalents. But the inherent
uncertainty in this system is that it is impossible to know the size of
the zone. That is the problem faced by both courts and potential
infringers-the doctrine of equivalents makes the scope of patents
less certain and interferes with the public notice function of patent
agreements. To try to bring balance back to the system, courts were
forced to develop a competing doctrine-prosecution history
estoppel.

59. Id. at 22, 117 S. Ct. at 1046.

60. Id.
61.

Warner-Jenkinson,520 U.S. at 41, 117 S. Ct. at 1054.

62. Id. at 28, 117 S.Ct. at 1048.
63. Id. at 29, 117 S. Ct. at 1049.
64. Id. at 33, 117 S. Ct. at 1051.
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D. ProsecutionHistoryEstoppel-ProtectionVersus Notice
Where the doctrine of equivalents was designed to protect the
patentee, prosecution history estoppel was designed to protect
competition.65 It prohibits patent-holders from claiming protection over
66
claims which were knowingly given up in the application process.
The patentee is estopped from arguing that he owns a right that he did
not, in the end, claim. In the continuing example, since the inventor
claimed a pH of approximately 6.0 as the lower end of his solution
range, he would be estopped from arguing that he meant his product to
include pH values below 6.0, since he knows such pH values exist, but
he did not claim them in the final draft of the agreement.
The Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit (hereinafter "CAFC"
or "Federal Circuit") was created by Congress in 1982 to promote
stability in patent law.67 The court has exclusive jurisdiction over
6
patent appeals and deals with more than fifty of these cases a year. 1
The creation ofthe CAFC has brought stability to patent law, except in
the area ofthe doctrine of equivalents, which it has wrestled with since
its inception. For several years, the CAFC has used what it called the
"flexible bar" approach, where the reasons claims were amended are
considered in determining if a patentee should be estopped from
asserting infringement.69 That is, it has to be clear to the court that the
patentee has purposely surrendered a claim during prosecution. Ifthere
is any doubt, the patentee would be allowed to expand his patent under
the doctrine of equivalents.7° The problem with the flexible bar is its
lack of precision-it is difficult for anyone to know what the zone of
protection is. Uncertainty due to the flexible bar damages the notice
function, which contravenes the government's goal ofencouraging the
progress ofscience.71 While the CAFC has deemed application ofthis
doctrine unworkable, the lower courts have had even greater difficulty
with it, since they are usually not well equipped to handle these
complicated, technical cases.72
65. Donner, supra note 17, at 93.
66. Id.
67. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-154 Stat. 25
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.A.) (establishing the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit).
68. CAFC statistics, availableathttp://www.fedcir.gov/#information, for years
1997-2002 (last visited Jan. 30, 2004).
69. Matthew J. Conigliaro, Andrew C. Greenberg & Mark A. Lemley,
Foreseeabilityin PatentLaw, 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1045, 1047 (2001).

70. Id.
71. Id.

72. See generallyKimberly A. Moore, Are DistrictCourtJudgesEquippedto
Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 Harv. J. Law & Tec. 1 (2001) (presenting empirical
evidence that suggests district court judges are not sufficiently capable ofresolving
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I1. FESTO ILLUSTRATES THE PROBLEM

A. FactsofFesto
Festo Corporation owns two patents,13 the "Stoll" and the
"Carroll," on a device known as a magnetic rodless cylinder, which
has many uses in robotics and other automated products. Inside the
cylinder is a piston which moves through the cylinder via pressurized
air. Outside the cylinder is a sleeve which is magnetically coupled to
the piston so that as the piston moves inside the cylinder, the sleeve
moves along with it on the outside of the cylinder. Therefore,
whatever is attached to the outside ofthe cylinder also moves, and the
device acts as a conveyor.74 Festo Corporation revolutionized the
field of robotics with this invention and made millions of dollars on
it, notably in animatronics such as those used by Disney in its theme
park creatures."
Since the Festo device was so successful, a rival company, SMC,
developed a competing device which it sold at a lower price. Festo
believed the SMC robotic arm was a knock-off ofits patented device.
In fact, the two products were so nearly identical that their parts were
interchangeable."
SMC countered that they were not literally
infringing Festo's patent because they made changes in the design of
the device. 8 They further argued that Festo's invention was modeled
on prior art from the 1960's and that SMC was simply doing the same
thing by producing a design-around.79 The courts would have to look
at the prosecution history to decide who was correct.
B. ProsecutionHistory ofFesto 's Patents
During the prosecution of the Stoll patent in 1980, the PTO
examiner initially rejected the relevant claim because the method of
operation ofthe device was unclear. 80 Dr. Stoll amended his claim to

patent cases accurately).
73. U.S. Patent nos. 3,779,401 (issued Dec. 18, 1973) and 4,354,125 (issued
Oct. 12, 1982). Both patents have expired, but are still being litigated.
74.

See Festo, 172 F.3d 1361, 1365, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999) for illustrations of

the device.
75.

Festo, No. Civ. A. 88-1814-MA, 1993 WL 1510657 (D. Mass.) at *1.

76. Id. at *2.
77.

Mark Harrington, Supreme Court Spells Out New Patent Guidelines,

Newsday.con, May 29, 2002, available at www.newsday.com/technology/nyfesto0528.storycoll-ny-technology (last visited October 18, 2002).
78. Festo, 1993 WL 1510657 (D. Mass.) at *18.
79. Id.

80. Id. at*12.
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state that the sleeve should be made of "magnetizable" material."'
This would seem reasonable since the sleeve and piston were to be
magnetically coupled, but this narrowing amendment ultimately
became a costly problem for Festo. SMC was able to make the same
device work with a nonmagnetizeable metal, thus avoiding literal
infringement.8 2 Nothing in the prosecution history shows exactly why
Stoll amended his claim in this particular way, but the examiner
3
allowed the claim as amended and the patent was granted.
The Carroll patent was issued in 1973, but was reexamined in
1988 in light of Stoll's patent." Festo added a claim to the Carroll
patent to include a pair of one-way sealing rings on the piston to
prevent impurities from entering.85 This narrowing amendment was
placed on the record to distinguish it from the prior art, and it too was
accepted by the examiner.8 6 Once again, SMC found a way to copy
this detail without literal infringement; instead ofusing two one-way
sealing
rings, SMC devices have a single sealing ring with a two-way
7
lip.8
C. ProceduralHistory
1. Lower CourtDecisions-FestoWins the FirstThree Rounds
In 1988 Festo Corporation filed suit against SMC arguing
infringement of both patents under the doctrine of equivalents. The
district court used the flexible bar approach to decide that prosecution
history estoppel did not apply and that Festo could indeed argue that
the magnetizable sleeve had substantially the same function and acted
in substantially the same way to obtain the same result as a
nonmagnetizable sleeve. 8 The jury agreed with Festo.
On the separate issue of the sealing rings, Festo won its motion
for summaryjudgment in the same way under the function/way/result
test of the doctrine of equivalents.8 9 SMC appealed both the jury
verdict and the grant of summary judgment. A panel of the CAFC

81. Id.
82. Id.at* 16.

83. Festo, 1993 WL 1510657 at "13.
84. Id. at *6. It was reexamined by the patent office because of the discovery
of an older German patent which had not been included during prosecution of the
Carroll patent and which raised a question of its patentability. The Carroll patent
was therefore amended to meet the requirements of the PTO. Id.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *9.
Id.
Id. at *26.
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affirmed both judgments," and SMC appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari but, at about the same time,
decided the related case of Warner-Jenkinson. Recall that in WarnerJenkinson, the Court remanded the case to the CAFC to determine
reasons the patentee had amended his claim.9 Since Festodealt with
a similar issue, the Supreme Court remanded it also for further
consideration.92 Accordingly, a three-judge CAFC panel affirmed all
previous judgments in favor of Festo.93 SMC petitioned the CAFC
to rehear the appeal en banc, and this petition was granted.9"
2. The En BancDecision-FestoLoses Round Four
Toward the end of the Supreme Court decision in WarnerJenkinson, the Court stated that it would "leave it to the Federal
Circuit how best to implement procedural improvements to promote
'
certainty, consistency, and reviewability to this area of the law."95
When remanding Festo for consideration in light of the WarnerJenkinson, the Court likely did not anticipate the lengths the CAFC
would soon go to heed this advice. In November of2000, an en banc
CAFC made a controversial 8-4 decision regarding Festo.96 The
court disregarded many years ofprecedent and instituted a "complete"
bar.97 Under such a bar, estoppel would arise from any claim
amendment made to comply with the Patent Act. Moreover, this
estoppel would act as an absolute bar against any claim of
equivalence for the amended element.9" This bright-line rule adopted
by the CAFC went against 150 years ofjurisprudence, contradicted
the Supreme Court instructions in Warner-Jenkinson, and caused a
great deal of controversy in the patent community.99
The CAFC argued that it was correct in overruling the flexible bar
because its experience with the approach was that it was unworkable
and that it contravened the public-notice function ofpatent claims.'°
90. Festo, 72 F.3d. 857 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
91. As discussed in text accompanying notes 56-64.
92. Festo, 520 U.S. 1111, 117 S. Ct. 1240 (1997).
93. Festo, 172 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
94. Festo, 187 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
95. Warner-Jenkinson,520 U.S. 17, at 41 n.8, 117 S. Ct. at 1054 n.8 (1997).
96. Festo, 234 F.3d. 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
97. Id. at 569.
98. Id. at 576.
99. See, e.g., Conigliaro, supranote 69; William M. Atkinson, Bruce J. Rose,
& John A. Wasleff, Was Festo Really Necessary?, 83 J. Pat. & Trademark Off.
Soc'y 111 (2001); Glen P. Belvis, An Analysis of the En Banc Decision in Festo
Corp.v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo KabushikiCo. and the DoctrineofEquivalents,
11 Fed. Cir. B.J. 59 (2002).
100. Festo, 234 F.3d at 575.
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The court noted that the flexible bar was a benefit to the patentee
that "comes at the public's expense."' 10 ' As Judge Plager of the
CAFC had earlier warned, the flexible bar was a "virtually
uncontrolled and unreviewable license for juries to find
infringement if they so choose."102
In fact, there are several advantages to the CAFC complete bar
rule over the previous flexible bar. The first is judicial efficiency-0 3
complex patent cases without clear rules clog the court system.1
These cases are usually difficult for both judge and jury as theytend
to be highly technical close calls."° It is logical that a bright line
rule would move cases through the system more quickly on
summary judgments and would provide incentives for parties to
settle out of court.
Another major advantage of the CAFC complete bar is that it
would provide clarity and certainty for potential infringers who
would know exactly what constitutes infringement and could better
make economic and long-term decisions, such as whether to attempt
to buy a license or to simply produce the product themselves.
Sometimes competitors believe it is cheaper to pay undeserving
royalties-even if they are confident they are not infringing-than
to fight in court."' These costs are passed along to consumers in
the form of higher prices."° The CAFC took note of situations
where some patentees were seeking greater coverage than their
patents allowed and were blackmailing competitors into paying
licensing fees. 7 The CAFC's bright-line rule could eliminate these
problems. Research and development would likely increase.10
Ironically, the CAFC, by ignoring much of the Supreme Court's
Warner-Jenkinson decision, had actually achieved the final
instruction of the Supreme Court-they had come up with a rule
which would have indeed promoted "certainty, consistency, and
reviewability to this area of the law."'

101. Id. at 576.
102. Hilton-Davis,62 F.3d. at 1538.
103. See generally Amend, supra note 54 (regarding complexity of patent
cases); Moore, supranote 7; Schwartz, supranote 34, at 130-35.
104. Id.
105. Brief of Intel Corporation, Cypress Semiconductor Corporation & United
Technologies Corporation as Amici Curiae in support of Respondents, at 2, Festo,
535 U.S. 722 (2002) (No. 00-1543).
106. Id. at 12.
107. Hilton-Davis,62 F.3d. at 1537.
108. Brief, supranote 105, at 11.
109. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 41 n.8, 117 S.Ct. at 1054 n.8 (1997), as
discussed in text accompanying note 95.
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D. The Supreme CourtSteps In
Eighteen months later, a unanimous Supreme Court, while
emphasizing with the difficulties faced by the CAFC in these cases,
nevertheless overruled them and ordered them to rehear the case
using a modified version of the flexible bar." ° The Court
disapproved of the CAFC decision for several reasons. First, the
absolute bar was unfair to the 1.2 million owners ofunexpired patents
who wrote their claims without knowledge of this rule and would
have to defend these claims based on principles they did not know
about at the time of application.
As the Court explained,
"[f]undamental alterations in these rules risk destroying the legitimate
expectations of inventors in their property.""' Second, the change
would have violated the principles ofstare decisis as it would have
overruled fifty Federal Circuit cases and eight Supreme Court
opinions.1 2 Finally, the Court felt that this complete bar would
disrupt the balance the Court had traditionally attempted to maintain
between the doctrine of equivalents and prosecution history
estoppel.' 3 For these reasons, the Court reinstated the flexible bar of
the doctrine ofequivalents but raised it with a rebuttable presumption
and a foreseeability test." 4 That is, the Court ruled that if a patentee
amends a claim, it will be presumed that he made it for reasons of
patentability and prosecution history estoppel will apply." 5 The
patentee has the burden for proving otherwise. Put another way, the
patentee is entitled to rebut the presumption that a narrowing
amendment surrendered the entire territory between the original and
amended claim. Specifically, the Court enumerated three "rebuttal
criteria;"
other reason. ''1 I tangentialness, and the catch-all category
of "some unforeseeability
If an equivalent is unforeseeable by a person trained in the art at
the time the patent is granted, prosecution history estoppel will not
apply." 7 That is, if the patentee successfully establishes that the
amendment was not for a reason ofpatentability, he can argue the use
110. Festo, 535 U.S. at 1843.
111. Id. at 1841.
112. Id. at 1837.
113. Id. at 1841.
114. Id. at 1842.
115. Id.
116. Festo, 535 U.S. at 1842. Specifically, the Court pointed out that "[t]he
equivalent may have been unforeseeable at the time of the application; the rationale
underlying the amendment may bear no more than a tangential relation to the
equivalent in question; or there may be some other reason suggesting that the
patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described the insubstantial
substitute in question."
117. Id.

2003]

COMMENTS

ofthe doctrine ofequivalents. While this may seem like an equitable
solution, it effectively gutted the doctrine ofequivalents for patentees
like Festo who amended claims without knowledge ofthis new courtcreated presumption.
E. Back to the CAFC
On September 26, 2003, an en banc CAFC rendered the ninth
judicial opinion in this case. n8s The CAFC had ordered the parties to
brief four questions-two dealing with the factors involving the
rebuttable presumption in general and two specifically dealing with
whether Festo could rebut the presumption.It' The CAFC concluded
that rebuttal of the presumption to surrender is a question oflaw to be
determined by the court, not ajury.'2 The Court then, addressing the
three rebuttal criteria, remanded the case once again to district
court-this time to determine whether Festo can rebut the
presumption ofsurrender by demonstrating that the accused device's
aluminum sleeve and sealing ring elements would have been
unforeseeable 2to1 a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time ofthe
amendments.'

Assuming no new facts come out in the remand to district court,
Festo Corporation will likely ultimately lose. How could Festo,
whose patented product was so closely copied by a competitor that
their replacement parts were interchangeable, lose this infringement
battle? The answer seems to lie in the doctrine of equivalents.
During prosecution ofFesto's patents, amendments were made with
the understanding that the doctrine would protect any equivalents. It
was understood that as long as the infringing device met the
function/way/result test, the patentee could win his battle. But the
Supreme Court, in Warner-Jenkinsonand Festo, limited the use of
the doctrine of equivalents to cases where claims were amended for
reasons unrelated to patentability. If Festo's lawyers cannot show
that they amended their claims for reasons unrelated to patentability,
they will be estopped from arguing that "magnetizable" is equivalent
to "non-magnetizable" and that two one-way rings are equivalent to
one ring with a two-way lip. 22 It is unlikely Festo's attorneys will be
able to meet this standard because they probably did amend the

118. Festo, 2003 WL 22220526 (Fed. Cir.), referred to as Festo IX.
119. Id. at*2.
120. Id. at *4.
121. Id. at *7.
122. Specifically, Festo will have to prove that the accused device's aluminum
sleeve and sealing ring elements would have been unforeseeable to a person of
ordinary skill in the art at the time of the amendments. Id.
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claims for reasons of patentability." 3 In fact, the Supreme Court
expressly stated that SMC "might well prevail" for these very
reasons. 24 Instead of receiving an estimated sixteen million dollars
in damages from sales lost to SMC,"2 ' Festo may be left with only
very large legal fees for depending on the doctrine of equivalents to
protect its patents. Even if Festo ultimately prevails, the victory
would come at tremendous cost.
III. SOLUTION-IT'S TIME FOR CONGRESS TO STEP IN

Because of the problems caused by the doctrine of equivalents,
Congress should consider eliminating it.'26 The Supreme Court paved
the way for this solution in Festoby stating that since the doctrine of
equivalents and prosecution history estoppel are settled law, "the
responsibility for changing them rests with Congress."' 27 The CAFC
tried to accomplish similar results with the complete bar but was
overruled for reasons of stare decisis and the retroactive effects of
such a rule. Although a legislative solution may seem controversial,
it complies with the intent of both courts and is fair to present and
future patent holders.
A. Rationalefor This Legislation
The Supreme Court stated in Festo that "the [patent] monopoly
is a property right, and like any property right its boundaries should
be clear. 28 The Court listed the problems with the doctrine of
equivalents. It makes the scope ofpatents less certain. 129 It can deter
competitors from engaging in legitimate manufacturing. 3 ' It causes
competitors to invest by mistake in competing products that the

123. There are not many other possible reasons for amending claims. For
example, these were not made to correct grammar in the original claim. If the
reasons for amending were not related to patentability, Festo's lawyers would likely
have made this argument long ago.
124. Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1842. The CAFC has made similar statements, such as
"it seems unlikely that an aluminum sleeve would have been unforeseeable as it was
made of a commonly available metal." Festo, 2003 WL 22220526 at *7.
125. Harrington, supranote 77.
126. Prosecution history estoppel and the flexible bar would automatically be
eliminated, since they were created to balance the doctrine ofequivalents. Instead,
courts would use the common law parol evidence rule.
127. Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1841.
128. Id. at 1837.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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patent secures.13 1 It can lead to wasteful litigation.3 3 The opinion
quoted Justice Hugo Black who, in 1950, astutely observed that the
doctrine required competitors to be able, "at the peril of heavy
infringement damages, to forecast how far a court relatively unversed
in a particular technological field will expand the claim's
language. 133 More recently, Judge Plager ofthe Court ofAppeals for
the Federal Circuit explained "whatever role the doctrine of
equivalents may have played in earlier times ... today the doctrine is
regularly used by patentees to seek
greater coverage for their patents
34
than the patent statute grants."'1
Additionally, the doctrine is less important today than it was in
the past because the quality and quantity of patent attorneys are
significantly greater today than in 1856 when the doctrine was first
created by the Supreme Court.1 35 As of October 2002, there were
27,000 active registered practitioners certified to practice before the
PTO (up from 25,000 in May of 2002).136 These agents must pass a
difficult test to be allowed to write claims. 37 Also, these agents can
use means-plus-fimction claim writing, which provides that
equivalents are already built into claims.
Eliminating the doctrine of equivalents would benefit patentowners who cannot afford expensive patent litigation and whose
rights are therefore effectively reduced by the present system. Patent
litigation can routinely take five years and cost millions ofdollars. 38
Writing patent applications would be easier in that patentees would
no longer have to delineate the reasons they amended claims.' 39
Finally, since this legislation would not be applied retroactively, it
would not negatively impact the 1.2 million present patent-holders
who amended their claims under the doctrine ofequivalents and who,
unfortunately for some, must depend on it in any future litigation.

131.

Id.

132. Id.
133. Id.at 1838.
134.

Hilton-Davis,62 F.3d. at 1537.

135. The doctrine's creation is described in text accompanying notes 44-48.
136. Statistics available at www.uspto.gov.
137. Id. The passing rate varies from about 35% to 70% but averages around
50%. Data available for years 1997-2002 on the PTO website, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dconi/olia/oed/examresults.htm (last visited Jan.
30, 2004). Applicants must have an approved science degree to qualify to sit for
the exam and must demonstrate that they possess the scientific and technical
training required. 37 C.F.R. § 10.7 (2003).
138. Brief, supranote 105, at 13. Stim, supranote 38, at 488.
139. Recall that the reasons claims are amended presently determine if the
doctrine of equivalents can be argued as discussed in text accompanying notes
114-17.
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B. Alternative to the DoctrineofEquivalents
A patent is a contract, so courts should interpret it using the
traditional common law rules of contract interpretation. This
formalist approach is especially appropriate in patent law because
written terms should have priority over unwritten expressions of
agreement to satisfy the public notice requirement. 140 Patent cases
are usually complicated affairs for trial courts and the parties tend
to be rather sophisticated. Therefore, courts should interpret claims
strictly since the parties know best the meaning of the claims.' 4 '
As in the case of common law contracts, words in patent claims
would be given their ordinary, common meaning and technical
words their technical meaning. When a term has more than one
meaning, it would be interpreted against the party who drafted it (in
this case, the inventor). Prior dealings would also be taken into
account as in other contract negotiations. For example, in the year
2000, IBM received nearly 1100 patents. 42 Their legal staff is
evidently very competent to write claims, and the PTO is
accustomed to dealing with them, so they would be held to a higher
standard than the individual writing a claim for the first time.
Another example of applying common law contract interpretation
is if claim language has two reasonable interpretations and only one
43
favors the public interest, this interpretation would be preferred. 1
In contracts, the process by which a court determines the
meaning ofthe language ofthe contract is called construction.'" In
patents, the same process occurs in claim interpretation in a
Markman hearing. ' At such a hearing, the judge determines the
scope of the claims at issue. The primary purpose ofthese rules is
to determine the parties' intent from the language oftheir agreement
and to give effect to that intent. A judge is not allowed to redraft
claims in the same way that he should not be allowed to redraft
contracts where the terms are clear, fairly negotiated, and a matter
of public record.
The plain meaning rule ofcontract interpretation would become
important under such a regime. The essence ofthis rule is that there
140. Robert E. Scott, The Rise andFallofArticle 2, 62 La. L. Rev. 1009, 1021
(2002).
141. Robert E. Scott, The Casefor Formalismin RelationalContract,94 Nw.

U.L. Rev. 847, 875-76 (2000).

142. Hovey, supranote 10, at 10.
143.

E. Allen Farnsworth, Contracts, 474 (3d ed. 1999).

144. Id. at 453.

145. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 116 S. Ct. 1384
(1996) (determining that patent claim construction is a matter oflaw and should be
decided by a judge rather than a jury).
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are some instances in which the meaning of language is clear, so
prior negotiations cannot be used in its interpretation."' Only later,
during the interpretation stage, would prior negotiations be
considered, and only if it was determined at the Markman hearing
that the language lacked the required degree of clarity.' 471
Contract law respects usage and trade terminology. 148 This
should also be the case in patent claims, as a very specific
vocabulary has evolved that patent agents and examiners
understand. For example, in patent claim writing, the word
"comprises" has a different meaning than the phrase "consisting of."
The former is considered broader and open-ended, and the latter is
considered a closed phrase which narrows a claim. 49 An
inexperienced claim writer may make an error in claim writing
which may cause a problem for his client. But in common law
contracts, a party that enters a vocation or trade is presumed to have
knowledge ofhis trade. 5 Similarly, in patents, since the agent had
to pass a difficult test to write the claims, it would be presumed that
he knew how to write them correctly.
The issue of unforeseeability would also be addressed under
such a strategy. After-arising technology is anticipated under this
scheme because, as in common law contracts, if a court is
convinced that an unforeseeable act occurred which the parties
could not have intended the contract to cover, the court is free to
interpret the contract in the interest of fairness.' In the same way,
if new technology arises that someone skilled in the art could not
have predicted, and if this technology would allow infringement of
a patent, a court would interpret the patent of favor of the patentee.
In Festo, the Supreme Court noted that a difficulty in patent
cases is that language is imperfect,' but this is true in all contracts.
A crucial difference is that patents also have abstracts, descriptions
and drawings to help illuminate the intentions of the parties. 3
Additionally, the parties involved are more sophisticated and
knowledgeable than most parties to contracts. Generally, patent
agents are attorneys and patent examiners are scientists or
engineers, so they are competent to write the agreement in such a
way that it encompasses what is desired on both sides. As an extra
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
patent).

Farnsworth, supra note 143, at 476.
Id. at 478.
Id. at 483-85.
Donner, supra note 17, at 43.
Farnsworth, supra note 143, at 486.
Id. at498.
Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1837.
Merges, supra note 31, at 13-26 (describing the architecture ofa modem
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measure of protection for the patentee, the PTO allows claims to be
broadened for up to two years after a patent is granted in a process
known as a reissue.'54 Once the agreement is made and the patent
granted, the law will protect what is in the contract and the inventor
will be estopped from arguing that he deserves property that he did not,
in the end, claim.
Finally, a court can, under extreme circumstances, rule on the basis
of equity. In other words, a court can rule that a defendant did not
literally infringe, but to avoid a clearly unjust result, can enjoin the
party from producing the item in question. In addition, a court may
award damages on the same basis. Equity rulings ofthis kind would
likelyz5be rare and would also be reviewable as they are in the common
law.
C. Festo and Wamer-Jenkinson CouldHave HadBetter Results
Without a DoctrineofEquivalents.
If there had been no doctrine of equivalents when the Festo
inventors amended their claims, their patent attorney might have
amended the claim differently. Recall that one claim was amended to
state that the sleeve was magnetizeable. Because ofthis unnecessary
narrowing, the patentee immediately lost rights to all
nonmagnetizeable sleeves, and SMC took advantage ofthis fact. The
patent agent could instead have described it using the means-plusfunction method, claiming something such as "a sleeve including a
means for being magnetically coupled to the piston." This would have
given Festo a much broader claim, and SMC could not have easily
copied it. But the claim-writer may have made the mistake becauseof
the doctrine of equivalents-he may have assumed the change would
be protected by it. In the same way, the other contested Festo claim
could also have been written more broadly to protect the patentee. It
could have claimed, for example, "a piston having at least two guide
rings, at least one of which would be a sealing ring and at least one of
which would be a guide ring."
Festo Corporation's situation would have been different if the
claims had been more carefully amended because their competitor,
SMC, likely would have been advised by their counsel that the device
they intended to manufacture would have infringed the patents. SMC
could then have tried to negotiate a license with Festo, but ifthat did
not work, it simply would have had to wait until the patent term was
up. That is the purpose ofthe patent system-the patent-owner's actual
right is to exclude others from manufacturing and selling his invention.
154. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2003).
155. As, for example, in the equitable concept of unconscionability.
generally Farnsworth, supranote 143, at § 4.28.
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In the case of Warner-Jenkinson,the patentees claimed a lower pH
limit of "approximately 6.0," but it is not clear exactly why that limit
was chosen. Evidence at trial suggests that the inventors did not feel
the process worked correctly at pH values below 6.0, so they could not
legitimately claim those values.r56 The inventors may have felt that the
doctrine ofequivalents would have covered values slightly below 6.0,
but this would be a risky strategy.' After all, a pH of5.0 has ten times
the hydrogen ion concentration as a pH of6.0, so ajury might not agree
that the two values are equivalent.'58 Without the doctrine of
equivalents around to obfuscate, the patentees in Warner-Jenkinson
could simply have chosen the lowest limit the PTO would have
allowed, thus claiming as much territory as possible. This territory is
exactly what the law would protect-no more and no less. Competitors
would know that anything beyond that range is fair game. The function
of a claim is ultimately to enable everyone to know, without going
through a lawsuit, what infringes a patent and what does not.
CONCLUSION

The public notice function ofclaims is ofparamount importance for
the technological advancement of society. When the objective public
record shows that a patentee has given up subject matter during
prosecution, the public is entitled to take that record on its word.
Patentees would be unjustly enriched if they could renege on the
bargain or ifthey could demand royalties for technology they agreed to
exclude from their claims.
Festo's Horst Saalbach made his daring escape from communist
East Germany by passing under a guarded railroad train.' 9 His
competitive nature prepared him for the battle he fights today, but
ultimately it is a fight he will likely lose. The doctrine of equivalents
was created to help patent-owners like his corporation, but it has
instead cost his company millions of dollars. Because the Supreme
Court has effectively gutted the doctrine of equivalents in Festo and
Warner-Jenkinson,Congress should consider eliminating it to prevent
patentees from depending on it to their detriment.
M. Aminthe Broussard*
156. Warner-Jenkinson,520 U.S. at 22 n.2, 117 S. Ct. at 1046 n.2 (suggesting
that the process foamed excessively at pH values below 6.0).
157. The jury could have just as easily concluded that this was a design-around
since it improved on the previous patent.
158. This is because the pH scale is logarithmic. The New Encyclopwdia
Britannica 350 (15th ed. 1989).
159. Harrington, supranote 3.
* I would like to thank Russel 0. Primeaux and Warner J. Delaune for
graciously sharing their knowledge ofpatent law with me.

